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02Introduction
This paper is a literature survey on capital flows to
developing countries. It analyzes the characteristics
of the different components of capital flows which
are short-term, long-term flows, portfolio, and foreign
direct investment. It also focuses on the factors,
internal and external, that make capital flow into
developing countries, as well as on the consequences
of these flows -and their reversals- on the health of
these economies. Finally, it surveys the policies that
have been implemented to handle this kind of flows
in search for the most recommendable ones.
It appears that although developing countries
have been almost desperately competing among
themselves to attract foreign capital, the effects of
that capital in the economies of the countries that
succeeded in this race —mainly Latin American and
East Asian countries- have not been that favorable.
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This a priori idea comes from the striking fact that
almost every paper surveyed -if not all of them-
suggests that capital inflows are Ònot an unmitigated
blessingÓ.
Less developed countries —LDC henceforth-,
with economies characterized usually by low domestic
saving rates and large current account deficits, have
looked for foreign savings in order to keep these
economies in the path of growth. The capital inflows
that bring those foreign savings and integrate these
economies to the world, increase investment and
consumption, and with it, they boost growth. This
financial integration to the world also reduces the
volatility of consumption by allowing risk
diversification and borrowing to offset temporary
declines in income.
There is also a dark side of the effects of capital
flows on the recipient economies, such as monetary
expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange
appreciation, risks to the financial sector,  and even larger
current account deficits. To all these, add the increased
volatility caused by the possibility of large reversals taking
place as a consequence of changes in expected asset
returns, investor herding behavior, and contagion.
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Capital flows seem to be a problem when they
take place in large amounts. The most recent waves
happening during the seventies and the nineties. It
is in these two periods that this paper focuses to
withdraw its conclusions.
The first of these waves starts with large
deposits in American and European banks coming
from oil exporter countries. These banks were in need
of investing these funds, thus channeled them as
loans to Latin American countries, which were avid
of capital inflows to financing their large current
account deficits and public expending programs.
Since those loans were not invested in productive
activities, they did not provide funds for their
repayment, making necessary to get additional loans.
The situation turned into a snow ball that burst in
1982 when the Mexican government declared that
it could not service the debt. It was just a matter of
time for many other countries in the region to follow
the same path. This crisis prevented new capital flows
to arrive not only to the region but to other
developing regions until the beginning of the nineties.
The second wave that took place in the
nineties was even stronger and its characteristics were
very different from the previous one. This time capital
arrived in the form of investment, not debt, and it
was mainly private capital directed towards private
agents. By 1996, its amount was four times the inflows
of 1990, almost $190 billion. These inflows were
highly concentrated in Asia and Latin America, and
within them, 75% of the total went to just a dozen
countries.2
Although the nature of the capital flows is
very different in these two periods, the large and rapid
reversal of flows is a common characteristic. With
this reversal, the crisis, loss of market access, and spill-
over effects are also common. Being this the case,
the first question that needs to be addressed is if the
composition of capital flows —long-term versus short-
term- matters to prevent large reversals.
 A first classification of capital flows is
according with their maturity: short-term for a
maturity less that one year and long-term for a longer
maturity. Another classification corresponds to the
destination of the capital flows: debt (sovereign,
financial, and non-financial, borrowing and lending),
equity (portfolio investment in stock markets), and
foreign direct investment (FDI).
From the point of view of desirability, FDI is
usually preferred to the other types of flows. It not
only generates growth through the knowledge spill-
over and technology transfer that it brings but it also
appears to be less volatile, since it is argued that FDI
has low sensitivity to international interest rates
because is driven by long-term profitability. Compared
to FDI, portfolio flows are considered less desirable
because they exhibit greater volatility since it is less
costly to reverse them. The last ones in the desirability
rank will be short-term flows other that portfolio
investment, i.e. short-term debt.
The greater volatility of capital flows to Latin
America compared to those directed to Asia has been
explained on the basis of the different composition
of these flows. However, if portfolio investment is
separated from short-term flows, the magnitude of
the latter and its share in total capital flows is greater
in Asia that in Latin America (Lopez-Mejia, 1999).
Therefore, the volatility of capital flows in Latin
America can not be attributed to significantly larger
inflows of short-term capital in comparison with
Asian countries. Montiel and Reinhart (1997), cited
by Lopez-Mejia (1999), conclude that the
explanation relies rather in a poorer macroeconomic
policy track record and shakier credibility.
Chen and Khan (1997) search for an
explanation of why the composition of capital flows
varies across regions. They found that although the
absolute levels of growth potential and financial
market development are relevant, it is also important
the relative magnitude of these two factors. It can be
concluded from their findings that a better financial
market structure does not guarantee portfolio flows
by itself. Additionally, the good quality capital flows
is not necessarily characterized by a high level FDI
and a low level of portfolio flows. This composition
can be just a sign of an underdeveloped financial
market in the recipient country that hampers the
attractiveness of its growth potential.
2 In order of amount received: China, Brazil, Mexico,
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Argentina, Malaysia, India,
Turkey, Hungary, and Russia. (IMF, World Economic
Outlook data base.)
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The desirability of FDI over portfolio flows is
a question that has not been settled yet. In order to
shed more light into this discussion, Claessens,
Dooley, and Warner (1995)3  —CDW henceforth- try
to answer the question: Portfolio capital flows, hot
or cold? In another words, are portfolio flows hot
money —speculative and reversible- or cold money —
based on fundamentals and reversible only when
fundamentals change-. These authors cite Reisen
(1993) concluding that the majority of flows to Latin
America are hot rather than cold; Nunnenkamp
(1993) concludes that hot money transactions have
been relatively small in the Chilean case but
significantly large in Brazil; finally, Turner (1991)
ranks short-term bank flows as least volatile, and
long-term bank flows as least volatile, followed by
FDI as the next-to-last volatile.  All these studies
are based on the label given to the flow in the balance
of payment statistics, and they try to infer persistence
from the labels. CDW, on the contrary, using only
time-series statistics on persistence, try to identify
the label.
Even if labels are meaningful, it could be the
case that, according to the current stage of
development of financial markets it, would be difficult
to tell apart short-term flows from long-term ones
based on their nature. Nowadays, multiple financial
instruments are available to finance any project, and
so if a tight link ever existed between the financing
method and the underlying nature of the project, it
is probably becoming increasingly loose. A Treasury
bond with a thirty-year maturity can be sold on the
secondary market, and short-term assets can be
continuously rolled over. Many observers seem to base
their notion that short-term flows are more volatile
on the fact that they need to be repaid faster.
Although rapid repayment may lead to higher
volatility of gross flows, it need not make net flows
more volatile. Short-term flows that are rolled over
are equivalent to long-term assets, and a disruption
of gross FDI inflows, can cause its net flow to be
equivalent to the repayment of short-term flow
(CDW, 1995).
CDWÕs findings are that long-term flows are
the most important component for all countries in
the sample, except the United States and Japan,
where, respectively, short-term flows and portfolio
flows are more important. As a measure of volatility,
they use the coefficient of variation and found,
surprisingly, that short-term flows have the lowest
coefficient in seven countries. Long-term flows are
followed by FDI and then by portfolio flows in terms
of volatility. To assess persistence, they search for
autocorrelation in the time-series data, where FDI
and long-term flows are expected to exhibit positive
autocorrelation, and short-term flows should show a
zero or even negative autocorrelations. Only Japan
conform to these expectations, becoming the
exception more than the rule. Another way to check
for persistence is calculating half-lives from impulse
response functions. Again, with the exception of
Japan, most of the half-lives are one, meaning that
shocks die out after just one quarter. In addition, there
is little evidence that supposedly persistent flows such
as FDI and long-term debt exhibit more memory than
other flows. Finally, they test for predictability and
find that long-term flows are at least as unpredictable
as short-term flows, and knowledge of the type of
flow does not improve the ability to forecast the
aggregate capital account.
The results of the study presented above are
striking for what CDW call Òthe conventional
wisdomÓ or the general acceptance about the greater
volatility of short-term flows. Sadly, the study does
not cover the many financial crises that took place
in the nineties, starting from Mexico 1994. This fact,
along with the use of a limited sample of ten countries,
constitute an impediment to accept its conclusions
and start drawing policy recommendations based on
it. Many studies that have been previously cited in
this paper have found that at least short-term flows
are more volatile and require a positive action from
the recipient countries. In relation with portfolio
flows —restricted to equity investment-, the question
remains debatable.
However, before entering into the field of
policy recommendations, lets analyze what causes
capital to flow from one country to another,
specifically from a developed country into a
developing one.3 This study is performed on five industrial countries (France,
Germany, Japan, US, and UK) and 5 developing countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, The Republic of Korea, and
Mexico).
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Causes of Capital Flows.
Traditionally, two different groups of causes of capital
flows have been identified. One group comprises the
internal or ÒpullÓ factors, which corresponds to
developments in capital-importing countries that
have improved private risk-return characteristics for
foreign investors. This have been achieved through
increased creditworthiness as a result of structural
reform, basically market-oriented reforms such as
trade and capital market liberalization, in addition
to debt restructuring and improved macroeconomic
management. The other group of causes corresponds
to the external or ÒpushÓ factors, among them, the
market conditions in developed countries in terms
of world interest rate, business cycles, and exchange
rates of major countries (Frankel and Roubini, 2000;
Kim, 2000; cited in Kim, Kim, and Wang,
forthcoming).
It is important to establish the relative
importance of these two groups of causes since policy
recommendations will vary in each case. If causes
are mainly external or exogenous, only indirect,
compensatory policies can be considered. If causes
are domestic, however, more direct measures may be
the other hand, it was the growing importance of
institutional investors which were more willing to
invest abroad because of higher long-term expected
rates of return and risk diversification. What was seen
during the rest of the decade was a race of capital-
importing countries with the US New Economy
companies in order to attract this institutional
investment (Kim, Kim, and Wang, forthcoming).
Kim (2000) applies a structural VAR model
to investigate the sources of capital flows in four
developing countries4  and finds that there is a
drastic increase in the role of external factors —
mainly foreign interest rate and output- in the
determination of all domestic variables including
output, the real exchange rate, and the capital and
current account balances. The role of domestic
supply and aggregate demand shocks declined in the
sample countries. In the nineties, the large capital
inflows —and its sharp reversal- in all four countries
are mostly related to external shocks. This is
consistent with the findings of Calvo et al. (1993)
in Latin America. The role of foreign interest rate
is as significant as reported by Fernandez-Arias and
Montiel (1996). Kim (2000) concludes that the
relative importance of external shocks seems a robust
4 Chile, Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico.
feasible. (Fernandez-Arias and
Montiel, 1996).
Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhardt (1994) suggested
that cyclical conditions in
industrial countries have been
the main factor driving these
flows to developing countries,
in particular, the decline in the
world interest rates observed
in the early nineties combined
with recession in the main
industrialized countries.
However, in 1994, the world interest rate was
increasing but capital continued to flow to emerging
economies, suggesting that there was more into play
in investors decisions. Lopez-Mejia (1999) mention
how two developments in the financial structure of
capital-exporting countries  increased the
responsiveness of private capital to cross-border
investment opportunities: on one hand, falling
communication costs, strong competition, and rising
costs that led firms in industrial countries to produce
abroad in order to increase efficiency and profits. On
feature of capital flows.
Contrary to those that
support exogenous factors as
the main driving force of
capital flows, Schadler et al.
(1993) cited by Lopez-
Mejia(1999) argued that
domestic factors were the
dominant cause of capital
inflows to emerging markets.
They noticed that changes in
external factors did not
coincide and even postdated
the surges in some of the countries reviewed.
Moreover, the variation in timing, persistence, and
intensity of the inflows among the different countries
suggested that investors might have reacted to
country-specific factors. The World Bank also
provided evidence to highlight the importance of
domestic factors, i.e. countries with the strongest
fundamentals attracted the largest flows; FDI is
the largest component of these flows and it is
not explained by changes to interest rates but to
In summary, both types
of factors cause capital to flow.
The presence of push factors is
required for capital to actually flow
out of capital-exporting countries,
but pull factors will determine
the destination of those flows.
43
A
D
-M
IN
IS
T
ER
  
U
ni
ve
rs
id
ad
 E
A
FI
T
  
 M
ed
el
ln
  
N
m
er
o 
1 
 j
ul
 -
 d
ic
  
20
02
macroeconomic fundamentals; portfolio flows, which
are sensitive to interest rates, continued to increase
despite the increase in global interest rates.
In summary, both types of factors cause capital
to flow. The presence of push factors is required for
capital to actually flow out of capital-exporting
countries, but pull factors will determine the
destination of those flows. Particularly, in the case of
portfolio investment, exogenous factors are decisive,
but internal development of financial markets in the
recipient country will be needed to attract it. In what
concerns to policy responses, causes seem to vary as
well as their relative importance, therefore, more than
withdrawing a general conclusion, governments
should identify clearly what is causing changes in
capital flows before implementing an specific policy,
since the advisable response will vary according to
the nature of the factor.
Having explored the causes of capital inflows,
in what follows next, the effects on the recipient
economy are discussed.
Capital inflows: an unmitigated blessing?
transfer, and knowledge spill-over, i.e. better
management.
However, along with all these benefits, capital
flows create new risks for the recipient economies.
Those risks include overheating of the economy due
to capital surge and excessive expansion of aggregate
demand, increasing volatility in prices and exchange
rates due to volatile movement of capital flows and
transmission of foreign shocks (Kim, Kim, and Wang,
forthcoming). They also affect the financial system
that intermediates these flows, and can exacerbate
microeconomic distortions already present in the
recipient economy.
The first one of these risks, the
macroeconomic overheating, is due to an excessive
expansion of aggregate demand. This expansion is
likely to be reflected in inflationary pressures, real
exchange rate appreciation, and widening current
account deficits. These effects depend largely on the
exchange rate regime. Under a free float, a positive
shock to the capital account generates no change in
international reserves and monetary aggregates, but
creates a nominal exchange-rate appreciation that
induces a current account deficit. Under fixed
exchange rates, the intervention of the monetary
Both, benefits and risks, seem
to come along with capital
inflows. That is the conclusion
withdrawn from all the papers
reviewed, where capital inflows
are qualified as mixed or Ònot
an unmitigated blessingÓ.
Among the benefits
are growth, inter-temporal
optimization, risk sharing
through portfolio diversi-
fication and efficiency gains
(Kim, Kim, and Wang forthcoming). Foreign
capital flows can boost growth by increasing capital
accumulation. Additionally, they compensate for
the low rate of domestic savings that characterized
less developed economies. Agents in these
economies may also smooth con-sumption that
otherwise will be unstable because of business
cycles. Greater financial integration allows these
agents to diversify their portfolios away from
country-specific risks. Finally, the efficiency gains
come from financial deepening, technology
In addition to the
macroeconomic overheating,
the economy may suffer due to
weaknesses or mismanagement
within the financial system that intermediates the capital
flows. If these flows are sterilized by the monetary
authorities, banks usually find themselves with large
holdings of treasure bills. If no sterilization is taking place,
banks will have large funds virtually ÒparkedÓ there,
situation that pushes them to increase their loans, usually,
paying less attention to loan quality and to matching the
maturity of deposits with that of the loans —the first ones
frequently shorter-. If flows reversal takes place, the result
is a financial crisis, a problem that will be magnified if
bank supervision is poor (Calvo et al., 1994).
authorities to defend the
parity leads to reserve accu-
mulation, lower domestic
interest rates, and higher
domestic asset prices. The
result is an expansion of
aggregate demand with
inflation.
Both, benefits and risks, seem
to come along with capital inflows.
That is the conclusion withdrawn
from all  the papers reviewed,
where capital inflows are
qualified as mixed or
Ònot an unmitigated blessingÓ.
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Lastly, microeconomic distortions already
present in the economy can exacerbate the risks of
macroeconomic overheating and financial system
distress, which cause a cycle where a ÒboomÓ takes
place first, usually followed by a ÒbustÓ.  Among the
factors that can exacerbate these boom and bust
cycles are the lack of credibility on the domestic
reforms implemented by the recipient country. Also,
the presence of asymmetric information because of
herding behavior, adverse selection, and moral hazard
cause inefficiencies in the allocation of capital inflows.
In the same way, shallow capital markets where sales
by one group of investors lead to general fall in asset
prices and with it to a ÒbustÓ. Finally, price and wage
rigidities may cause exchange rate overshooting as
described in the Dornbusch model (Calvo et al. 1994,
Lopez-Mejia, 1999).
However, the major risk of all is the
occurrence of a large reversal. This can happen if
the exogenous cause disappears, i.e. the world interest
rate starts to rise. Or it can be caused by lack of
confidence on domestic macroeconomic policies that
lead to speculative attacks, and with them, to balance
of payments crises. Leading indicators of crises are a
persistent decline in international reserves, rapid
growth of domestic credit relative to demand for
money, fiscal imbalances, credit to the public sector,
and the evolution of the real exchange rate and the
current account balance. Fundamentals and
ÔsentimentalsÕ —investors perception of the health of
the economy- combine to cause the stampede of
investors. Thus, large inflows can be followed by large
reversals that, in some cases, leave the recipient
economy in an even worse shape than it had before
receiving the inflows.
In recent times, and as a consequence of
greater financial integration, a phenomenon called
contagion has been present in financial crises. The
available literature shows that contagion may happen
through four channels: trade agreements, Òwake-up
callÓ like the collapse of one currency that alters the
investors perception about other countries
fundamentals, herding behavior, and financial links
between countries (Lopez-Mejia, 1999). Due to
contagion, financial crises that started in one country
has been extended to entire regions or have reached
even farther. Therefore, large reversals of capital flows
may occur in one country not only as a consequence
of its own weaknesses but also caused by problems of
neighbor countries or, in some sense, related
countries. This fact adds more risk to capital flows.
In conclusion, capital inflows play a very
important role by being an alternative for capital-
importing economies to undergo a path of growth, a
possibility that otherwise will be undermined by the
lack of sufficient domestic savings. However, there is
a large number of risks associated with these capital
inflows which are magnified by the fact that those
capital-importing countries usually do not have
neither adequate institutions, deep financial markets,
strong banking systems, nor enough macroeconomic
expertise. All these factors put together make capital
inflows to developing countries not an unmitigated
blessing. Therefore, adequate policy responses should
be put in place to prevent the occurrence of crises,
as explained in what follows.
Policy Responses.
The appropriate policy response depends on the
nature of the cause of capital inflows, that is, if it is
exogenous or endogenous, temporary or permanent.
If exogenous, the ability of the authorities to
intervene will be more limited. If temporary, the
measures taken should be temporary as well.
Policy responses may be classified in three
different categories: counter-cyclical policies, such
as sterilization, flexible exchange rate, and fiscal
policy. The second group will be structural policies
like trade policy, and banking supervision and
regulation. The last group comprises capital controls.
The main counter-cyclical policy is
sterilization by which the monetary authorities can
avoid aggregate demand pressures when the exchange
rate regime is not completely flexible. Nominal
exchange rate appreciation is  prevented by
accumulating international reserves.
Sterilization can be done  through open
market operations, increases in reserve requirements,
and management of public sector deposits. The first
one, open market operations, takes place through the
central bank sale of high yield assets in exchange for
low yield reserves. It reduces financial intermediation
of the flows and with it, the risk for the banking
system of a sudden reversal of those flows. However,
it generates fiscal problems because of the fiscal
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burden of the high yield instruments issued. It also
increases domestic interest rates, inducing further
capital flows, flows that will be more of the short-
term type.
Increasing reserve requirement for banks is
another way to sterilize. It offsets the monetary
expansion caused by the intervention of the central
bank in the foreign exchange market. It limits the
ability of banks to lend without the fiscal burden that
open market operations cause. However, it also
introduces distortions in the credit market affecting
the efficient allocation of those loans, and it can
further produce disintermediation, case in which the
desired monetary reduction is not achieved.
An additional way to sterilize is shifting
deposits of the public sector from the banking system
to the central bank. In this case, there is neither fiscal
burden nor implicit taxing to the banking system
through higher reserve requirements. Its limitations
come from the availability of eligible funds. According
with Kim, Kim, and Wang (forthcoming), the
empirical evidence about the effectiveness of
sterilization is mixed and studies on developing
countries often conclude that it has only short-term
effects.
Another policy that can be implemented is
letting the exchange rate to float. For Calvo et al.
(1994), allowing the exchange rate to float has the
advantage of making money supply and domestic
credit exogenous with respect to capital inflows.
Greater exchange rate uncertainty might discourage
short-run speculative inflows. The main disadvantage
would be the nominal and real exchange rate
appreciation that will take place, hurting strategic
sectors of the economy such as non-traditional
exports. If the equilibrium real exchange rate
appreciated, this policy has the advantage that the
real appreciation occurs through the nominal
exchange rate appreciation rather than through
inflation increases. However, the merits of this policy
are not always warranted since when a currency
appreciates as a result of capital inflows, the
expectations of the market can attract further inflows,
causing greater appreciation in the nominal exchange
rate in addition to a large current account deficit.
The third counter-cyclical policy is to increase
fiscal discipline to lower aggregate demand. With this
policy, the costs of sterilization are avoided. It is a
substitute for exchange rate flexibility as a
stabilization policy, it limits the appreciation of the
real exchange rate since most of the public
expenditures are in non tradable goods, consumption
will be also lower with a less appreciated currency
since it is more oriented towards traded goods, and
the current account deficit will be also lower.
However, fiscal policy is not so flexible since it requires
the approval of the Congress, limiting its effectiveness
to counteract fluctuations in capital flows.
Among the structural policies are trade policy,
and banking supervision and regulation. Trade
liberalization can reduce the appreciation of the real
exchange rate by shifting expenditure to tradable
goods and restricting the net inflow of foreign
exchange. However, the evidence suggests that the
impact of trade liberalization on the trade balance is
ambiguous (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996).
Furthermore, it can induce additional inflows by
increasing creditworthiness in domestic macro-
economic management.  The other structural policy
is improvement in banking supervision and
regulation. As Kim, Kim, and Wang (forthcoming)
remark, based on Johnston (1998), it is an important
condition before financial liberalization which was
usually overlooked in previous studies about financial
markets liberalization. This policy is necessary to
reduce the vulnerability of the financial sector during
periods of capital inflows associated with lending
booms and surge in asset prices.
The last group of policy responses is comprised
of measures to control capital inflows. The issue of
the convenience of establishing capital controls and
their effectiveness has been subject to a great
discussion. As Kim, Kim, and Wang (forthcoming)
pointed out, the Òmainstream view is that capital
controls cannot substitute sound macroeconomic
policies. In addition, flexible exchange rate regime
alone may not be able to reduce massive capital
inflows, especially short-term capital inflows.
Therefore, there may be a need for emerging market
economies to manage massive short-term capital
inflows, while they continue to strengthen their
financial systemÓ.
The objective of capital controls is to reduce
monetary and credit expansions during inflow periods
and, during outflows, they try to avoid high interest
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rates that could cause distress in the financial system.
These controls can be quantitative to regulate the
volume of capital flows or tax-like measures as non-
remunerated reserve requirements in foreign
borrowing or simply transaction tax. They mainly
target short-term capital that is perceived as more
volatile and destabilizing.
Quantitative restrictions, if implemented for
medium or long-term can affect seriously the
competitiveness and development of the economy.
The literature reviewed is more inclined towards the
implementation of tax-like measures, specifically the
one that is know as Tobin tax. This is a tax on foreign
exchange trading or on short-term cross-border bank
loans. It is said to operate as Òthrowing sand in the
wheels of international financeÓ. This kind of tax has
several advantages. It increases the autonomy of
domestic monetary policy, reduces the likelihood of
speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes,
and encourages long-term investment over the short-
term speculative one. However, to be effective, it has
to be adopted worldwide, otherwise, the taxed
activities will shift to untaxed countries. Additionally,
the Tobin tax will reduce trading and lead to less
liquid markets, meaning more volatile international
financial markets.
Capital controls not always imply restrictions
imposed on capital inflows. They can also pursue to
encourage capital to flow out of the country and the
goal of lowering net inflows may be achieved in this
way as well. However, the removal of constraints to
capital outflows may also attract new capital inflows
since investors will be assured that they can leave
the country whenever is convenient for them.
The experience of emerging economies
imposing capital controls is mixed in terms of efficacy.
Chilean controls during most part of the nineties are
cited as a successful example, specifically in
lengthening the maturity of the inflows according to
Bernard and Cardoso (1998). The Chilean controls
comprised a non-remunerated deposit at the central
bank and a minimum holding period for inflows
entering this country. Sebastian Edwards (1999) is
not so enthusiastic about the success of these
measures. He considers that by implementing these
measures, Chile failed to attract investors with a
longer term view that would have contributed to a
greater development of the financial markets in this
country. On the other hand, the effectiveness of
capital controls is usually undermined by the ability
of investors to go around the regulations through
methods such as over-invoicing imports, under-
invoicing exports, and mislabeling capital flows
(Edwards, 1999; Singh and Weisse, 1998; Lopez-
Mejia, 1999; Kim, Kim, and Wang, forthcoming).
As it was said above, the issue of how
convenient is to impose controls to capital flows
remains subject to discussion. In any case, they should
be considered just as one of the many policies that
can be used to manage capital flows. It is more likely
that, depending on the causes of the flows, more than
one policy should be put in place. Even if the
adequate policy response varies from one case to the
other, it is clear in the case of emerging economies
that an active management of capital flows is
required.
Conclusions.
In conclusion, capital inflows play a very important
role by being an alternative for capital-importing
economies to undergo a path of growth, a possibility
that otherwise will be undermined by the lack of
sufficient domestic savings. However, there is a large
number of risks associated with these capital inflows
which are magnified by the fact that those capital-
importing countries usually do not have neither
adequate institutions, deep financial markets, strong
banking systems, nor enough macroeconomic
expertise. All these factors put together make capital
inflows to developing countries not an unmitigated
blessing.
The greater risks are the increased volatility
that capital inflows bring, and the possibility of large
reversals. From this point of view, does the composition
of capital inflows matter to the point that certain types
are more desirable than others? FDI and long-term
flows appear the less volatile, followed by portfolio and
short-term flows. Although CDW study found little
evidence of short-term capital flows being more volatile
than longer term ones, their study stands alone,
corresponds to a small sample of ten countries  and
was performed previously to the crises of the nineties,
shedding little light on this issue.
Exogenous and endogenous factors cause
capital to flow. The presence of push factors is
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required for capital to actually flow out of capital-
exporting countries, but pull factors will determine
the destination of those flows. Particularly, in the case
of portfolio investment, exogenous factors are
decisive, but internal development of financial
markets in the recipient country will be needed to
attract it. In what concerns to policy responses, causes
seem to vary as well as their relative importance,
therefore, more than withdrawing a general
conclusion, governments should identify clearly what
is causing changes in capital flows before
implementing an specific policy, since the advisable
response will vary according to the nature of the
factor.
The appropriate policy response depends on
the nature of the cause of capital inflows, that is,
exogenous or endogenous, temporary or permanent.
If exogenous, the ability of the authorities to
intervene will be more limited. If temporary, the
measures taken should be temporary as well.
Policy responses may be classified in three
different categories: counter-cyclical policies, such
as sterilization, flexible exchange rate, and fiscal
policy. The second group will be structural policies
like trade policy, and banking supervision and
regulation. The last group comprises capital controls.
The issue of how convenient is to impose controls to
capital flows remains subject to discussion. In any
case, they should be considered just as one of the
many policies that can be used to manage capital
flows. It is more likely that, depending on the causes
of the flows, more than one policy should be put in
place. Even if the adequate policy response varies
from one case to the other, it is clear, is that for the
case of emerging economies, an active management
of capital flows is required.
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